On a Detail Of POlitical cOnfrOntatiOn in the territOry Of MeMel in the 1930s
Julius Žukas Klaipėda University A brief but rather eloquent message on 25 April 1934 from the consul-general of Germany in Memel (Klaipėda) to the Foreign Ministry in Germany, which highlights some less well-known aspects of the problem, reflects probably the period of the biggest confrontation between Lithuania and Germany in the Territory of Memel, that is described in Lithuanian historiography as a decisive clash between central government and the opposing forces.
1 To properly understand the reasons for and the circumstances of both the Lithuanian and German disagreements in the Territory of Memel, and the appearance of the document, it is necessary to briefly overview the nature and the dynamics of political relations in the Territory of Memel in the interwar period.
It is obvious that the interwar conflict between Lithuania and Germany over the Territory of Memel was unavoidable, and based on the very circumstances of the annexation of the region by Lithuania. To start with, under normal circumstances, Germany would never have given away even a foot of its territory; however, its defeat in the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles made Berlin reconcile itself to the loss of part of the lands ruled by Germans for centuries. These lands included the Territory of Memel. Article 28 of the Treaty of Versailles separated it from Germany, and Article 99 transferred it to the disposal of the great powers, the Entente. 2 The ruthless conditions of the Treaty of Versailles spawned revisionism by the German nation and a desire for revenge. Inevitably, the day had to come that General von Seeckt wrote about: 'We need to regain our power, and then, of course, we will take back what we lost.' 3 In the case of the Territory of Memel, Germany preferred to choose the lesser evil, and to see it temporarily under the wing of a weak Lithuania rather than of Poland. After Lithuania's rejection of Hymans' project, and with the contours of a pro-French free state (Freistaat) emerging in Memel, as desired by Poland, in October 1921, the German government felt inclined to transfer the region to Lithuania. 4 In the Reichstag meeting 1 on 28 November 1921, the chancellor Joseph Wirth openly declared: if the French protectorate in Memel can be considered beneficial to Poland, Germany would prefer Memel to be annexed by Lithuania. 5 In February 1922, secret consultations between Germany and Lithuania began. On 22 February 1922 , Viktoras Gailius, the representative of Lithuania in Germany, reported being half-officially and half-secretly informed that the German government would be happy to transfer the Territory of Memel to Lithuania by driving the French out of it. At the end of April, the German envoy in Lithuania Fritz Schönberg assured the foreign minister Vladas Jurgutis that Germany would not oppose the annexation of the Territory of Memel by Lithuania; however, it would like to receive assurances that the cultural and economic rights of Germans in the region would not be violated. 6 Finally, Germany provided Lithuania with certain material assistance: when the Lithuanian government finally decided on the forceful annexation of the Territory of Memel, and included the Riflemen's Union in the implementation of the operation, the Riflemen's Union contacted the ruling powers of Germany through informal channels. Having arrived in Berlin, the couriers of the Riflemen's Union visited General von Seeckt, who assured them that, during the campaign, no German would fire a single shot at the Lithuanians. Moreover, the Germans sold the Riflemen muchneeded weapons and ammunition at a very low price. 7 Thus, the natural interest of the restored state of Lithuania to have its own access to the sea was only realised due to the fact that it coincided with the interests of Germany, which under the conditions at the time saw no better choice than to 'deposit' the Territory of Memel with Lithuania. Simultaneously, from the very first days of Lithuania's rule of the region, natural confrontations began: Lithuania sought to make the region part of the state as fast as possible, while Germany considered the new status quo, as we know, to be a temporary situation, and therefore opposed in all possible ways the 'Lithuanianisation' of the region. From the very beginning, Germany never intended to recognise Lithuania's right to the Territory of Memel, and also put constant pressure on the Soviet Union not to recognise Lithuania's right to the region. With the arrival of Toepke, the Consulate General again became the centre of the struggle against the governor and Lithuanian institutions in the region. To quote Governor Antanas Merkys, the Germans of Memel could not make a single move without the knowledge of the consul general. 20 As early as the middle of January of 1932, the Lithuanian envoy in Berlin handed the German government a note in which, for the sake of good relations between the two countries, the desire was expressed to have Toepke recalled from his position as consul general. In response, the German government announced that it would not satisfy the request of the Lithuanian government. 21 As a result of the clash, Governor Merkys was recalled from his position in May 1932, while Toepke stayed in office and was only recalled in the summer of 1934.
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The Law on the Protection of the Nation and the State that was promulgated on 8 February 1934 gave rise to a sharp collision between Lithuania and Germany with respect to influence in the Territory of Memel. From 9 February 1934, arrests of leaders and members of the newly established pro-Nazi parties in the region began, the activities of parties and some other German organisations in the region were suspended, and searches were carried out. extensively in historiography. 23 Germany's response to Lithuanian actions in the region was most negative: Berlin protested against the Law on the Protection of the Nation and the State, and made respective demarches to the states-signatories of the Convention concerning the Territory of Memel. Economic sanctions were applied to Lithuania (imports of pigs, butter, cheese and eggs from Lithuania were totally suspended), border traffic was minimised, and German diplomats residing in major European capitals formed the corresponding public opinion on the events in the Territory of Memel. 24 In April 1934, arrests of activists from pro-Nazi parties and paramilitary formations continued. 25 A message from Consul General Toepke to Berlin, written in that tense atmosphere, not only confirmed the facts that are already known to historians, but also demonstrated that the echoes of National-Socialism in the Territory of Memel caused confusion and differences of opinion both among the regional leaders of German parties and the staff of the Consulate General.
When collecting material for his multi-volume 'A History of Lithuanian Diplomacy', Dr Vytautas Žalys discovered the document published below and other documents of the interwar German Foreign Ministry in the National Archives of the United Kingdom in London. Sincere thanks are extended to him for permission to publish the text. A covering letter to the principal addressee, Eckhard von Schack, a secret advisor to the German Foreign Ministry and an expert in the affairs of the Baltic countries, was attached to the document. 26 The text is also presented. , karaliaučius mokyklų tarėjas meyeris, kurio sveikata, deja, kaip ir anksčiau yra prasta, netrukus išeis atostogų ir ta proga neabejotinai apsilankys pas jus.
prieš kurį laiką jis informavo mane raštu daugiau nebeturįs jokios kompromituojančios medžiagos. kadangi jis, kaip aš sužinojau, visgi saugojo pas save tam tikrą kiekį atsiskaitymui už per jį ėjusias pinigų sumas reikalingų pakvitavimų, aš jam nurodžiau tučtuojau sunaikinti ir šią medžiagą. aš turbūt galiu kaip savaime suprantamą dalyką manyti, kad taip pat ir jūs tokį laikymą pakvitavimų, kurie dalykiniu ir asmeniniu atžvilgiais yra nepaprastai pavojingi, laikote visiškai netoleruotinu, nors toks sąžiningumas, žinoma, daro ponui meyeriui didelę garbę. ponu meyeriu neabejotinai galima pasitikėti kaip patikimu darbuotoju, teisingai tvarkiusiu minėtus pinigus. Žinoma, mane labai džiugintų, jeigu grynai techninė pinigų kontrolė ateityje būtų vykdoma karaliaučiuje, ponas meyeris tam tikrai neprieštarautų.
kaip jums yra žinoma, įtempta politinė padėtis sukėlė tam tikrą trintį tarp senųjų ir naujųjų generalinio konsulato darbuotojų. nors visi jie siekia to paties, tačiau dažnai nesutaria dėl "kaip" ir "kada", ir jų kritiški požiūriai turi, deja, mums visiems žinomą pavojingą savybę galimai išeiti į viešumą. štai dabar neseniai staiga pasirodė nuomonė (deja, ponas meyeris yra vienas pagrindinių jos skleidėjų), kad nacionalsocializmo persimetimas į klaipėdos kraštą yra nelaimė, kuri esą susprogdino iki šiol vieningą vokiškumo vadovų frontą, šiuos lyderius iš dalies nustūmė į antrą planą ir galiausiai palengvins lietuviams sudaužyti autonomiją. ryšium su tuo buvo taip pat išsakyti priekaištai neumanno 31 ir jo bendražygių adresu, o pati partija 32 netgi iš dalies apibūdinta kaip klaidingas projektas.
Žinoma, visa tai yra faktų apvertimas aukštyn kojom. klaida buvo ne organizacinis skubančio bendradarbiauti ir veikti nacionalsocialistinio elemento suvienijimas, bet tokių patologiškų, nepatikimų ir menkaverčių kreatūrų kaip sassas 33 ir roppas 34 atsidūrimas šio jauno judėjimo priešakyje. tad teko, kaip sakoma, rinktis iš dviejų blogybių. Viena jų buvo ta, kad visas čionykštis vokiškumas ir visi vokiečių interesai klaipėdos krašte buvo atiduoti dispozicijon tokio žmogaus kaip sassas, kuris visų pirma ketino nuversti direktoriją ir paleisti seimelį. antroji buvo sukurti ir remti kontrjudėjimą. Vadovaujanti partija 35 pasirinko pastarąjį variantą. tai pasirodė esąs teisingas sprendimas, nes mažų mažiausiai pavyko išsklaidyti sasso bendražygius ir didžiąją nacionalsocialistinio elemento daugumą suburti apie neumanną. paskui, kaip žinoma, sassas dėl savo liguisto polinkio susireikšminti pavirto pavojingu, atsakomybės jausmo neturinčiu pamišėliu, patekusiu į lietuvių rankas, kurie jį sumaniai panaudojo prieš vokiškumą, ir galiausiai savo veiksmais ir išdavyste lemtingai prisidėjusiu prie dabartinės katastrofos. negalime paneigti, kad šiurkščių (tačiau ne piktavališkų!) klaidų padarė ir kiti, nepatyrę, žmonės, tačiau vien jie nebūtų sužlugdę vokiškumo.
aš nepamiršau paaiškinti ponui meyeriui kitokios nuomonės klaidingumą ir pabrėžiau esant nepakenčiama, kai tokių klaidingų požiūrių platinimas pakerta pasiryžimą padėti kalėjime sėdintiems neumanno šalininkams. jeigu dabar ieškotume kaltų, tai, mano nuomone, senoji klaipėdos krašto vadovų karta galėjo vienąkart pasikliauti savikontrole. šie vadai dirbo drąsiai, dorai ir tvirtai, tačiau nesuvokė, kad reikia įtraukti į šį darbą jaunimą, ir nacionalsocialistinio judėjimo proveržio akimirką buvo silpni ir bejėgiai. kaip tik meyeris -kaip ir daugelis kitų -nemaža dalimi turi būti dėkingi generalinio konsulato veiklai už tai, kad jo nuopelnai vokiškumui bei kovotojo asmenybė, nepaisant jo ankstesnės negatyvios (reicho prasme) partinės politinės veiklos, netrukus vėl buvo deramai įvertinti. kaip ir anksčiau, aš esu nuomonės, kad nacionalsocializmas klaipėdos krašte be galo daug prisidėjo prie asmeninio pasiryžimo aukotis ir tautos susitelkimo stiprinimo. dabartinė kova turi būti toliau tęsiama remiantis esama baze, nepaisant pesimistinių pranašysčių. savo ruožtu klaipėdos krašto liaudis pati panoro tokio virsmo ir, mano nuomone, būtent vadų reikalas yra gebėti vadovauti atliepiant liaudies norą. aš tokį pat raštą pasiunčiau ponui dr. oberländeriui ir prašysiu jį irgi padaryti atitinkamą įtaką ponui meyeriui. 
